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Labor Law/Municipal Law .Providence Lodge No. 3, Fraternal
Order of Police v. City of Providence, 730 A.2d 17 (R.I. 1999). A
decision of an arbitration panel is only reviewable by writ of certiorari to the Rhode Island Supreme Court and therefore a superior
court is without jurisdiction over such a matter. An arbitration
panel has the authority to modify cost of living adjustments
(COLA) prospectively, irrespective of a consent decree. However,
arbitrators must make an independent judgment as to whether a
city has the ability to pay a COLA other than the one proposed by
the city. Furthermore, an arbitration panel does not exceed its jurisdiction in awarding COLAs that differ from the COLA specified
in an ordinance.
Providence Lodge No. 3, Fraternal Order of Police v. City of
Providence' consists of two consolidated cases. 2 In each case, the
City of Providence (City) filed petitions for writ of certiorari and
raised issues in regards to arbitration awards that resulted from
two separate contract disputes. 3 One of the disputes was between
the City and Providence Lodge No. 3, Fraternal Order of Police
(FOP) and the other involved the City and the Firefighters' Union
Local 799 (Local 799).4
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In both of the cases consolidated for appeal, the parties selected a panel to arbitrate contract proposals, the first a contract
proposal set forth by the FOP, and the second a contract dispute
involving Local 799.5 Both panels awarded COLAs to each union
irrespective of the COLAs proposed by the City. 6 Pursuant to the

Municipal Police Arbitration Act (MPAA)7 and the Fire Fighters
Arbitration Act (FFAA), s the arbitration panel awarded the FOP a
five percent COLA 9 and Local 799 a six percent COLA.' 0 The City
1. 730 A.2d 17 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id. at 18.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-2 (1956) (1995
8. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9-1 (1956) (1995
9. It is noted that five percent was chosen
with the COLA in a previous agreement for the
dence Lodge No. 3, 730 A.2d at 18.

Reenactment).
Reenactment).
because this was in accordance
period of 1989-1991. See Provi-
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only proposed a COLA of three percent, which was in accordance
with a consent decree entered in December 1991.11
The 1991 consent decree was instated subsequent to a decision
by the Retirement Board to increase COLAs for all employees. 12 In
1992, in the case of Betz v. Paolino,13 the Rhode Island Supreme
Court stated that "the city council alone has the authority to
amend pension benefits under the retirement provision of the city
charter." 14 In 1994, the city council amended its retirement ordinance to reflect a three percent COLA. 15 This amendment modi16
fied the agreed upon COLAs set in the 1991 consent decree.
The City appealed the arbitration panels' decisions regarding
the FOP to the superior court. 17 The superior court confirmed the
police award.' Thereafter, the City appealed the superior court's
affirmance of the FOP award, and also sought review of arbitration
awards made regarding the Local 799 contract dispute.' 9
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Although the only aspect of the arbitration panels' awards
challenged by the City were the COLAs involved, a number of
other issues arose for the court to decide. 20 The first issue the
Rhose Island Supreme Court addressed was the City's argument
that the superior court did not have jurisdiction to affirm the
FOP's arbitration award. 2 1 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the superior court did not have jurisdiction to review the arbitration decision in light of section 28-9.1-15 of the Rhode Island
General Laws. 2 2 The court found this statute to be unequivocal in
its declaration that an arbitration panel's decision is only review10. See id.
11. See id. at 19.
12. See id.
13. 605 A.2d 837 (R.I. 1992).
14. Providence Lodge No. 3, 730 A.2d at 19 (citing Betz v. Paolino, 605 A.2d
837, 839-40 (R.I. 1992)).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 18.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id; R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9.1-15 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
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able under the FFAA and the MPAA by writ of certiorari to the
23
Rhode Island Supreme Court.
Secondly, the court addressed whether or not the arbitration
24
panel had the authority to modify the COLA for the two unions.
The court held that the 1991 consent decree did not preclude the
city council or an arbitration panel from modifying the COLA prospectively. 2 5 The court declared that this decision was consistent
26
with its earlier holding in Betz v. Paolino.
Next, the court considered whether or not the arbitration
panel had the power to make an independent judgment about the
COLA to be assessed for the new contract year. 27 After concluding
that the arbitration panel did have that authority, the supreme
court found that the arbitrators erred because they failed to make
an independent judgment regarding the ability of the City to pay a
28
COLA irrespective of the COLA that the City has proposed.
Finally, the court addressed whether the FFAA and MPAA
acts or an inconsistent home rule charter provision would apply in
interest arbitration procedures. 29 The court decided that an ordinance adopted pursuant to a city's charter provisions does not limit
an interest arbitration panel as a state statute could. 30 Similarly,
the court held that the charter provision does not supersede the
FFAA or the MPAA. 3 1 In unison with prior decisions, 32 the court
found the FFAA and the MPAA to be acts of general application
since they apply equally to all cities and towns, despite the fact
that they may vary from one municipality to another. 33 As a result, these acts of general application were held to supersede any
34
inconsistent home charter rules.
23. See Providence Lodge No. 3, 730 A.2d at 18.
24. See id. at 18-19.
25. See id. at 19.
26. 605 A.2d at 839-40 (finding that the retirement provision of the city charter gives the city council the sole authority to amend pension benefits).
27. See Providence Lodge No. 3, 730 A.2d at 19.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 19-20.
30. See id. at 20.
31. See id.
32. See, e.g., Town of Lincoln v. Lincoln Lodge No. 22, 660 A.2d 710, 719 (R.I.
1995); City of Cranston v. Hall, 354 A.2d 415, 417 (R.I. 1976); Marro v. General
Treasurer of Cranston, 273 A.2d 660, 662 (R.I. 1971); Opinion to the House of Representatives, 87 A.2d 693, 696 (R.I. 1952).
33. See Providence Lodge No. 3, 730 A.2d at 20.
34. See id.
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Therefore, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sustained the
City's appeal of an earlier arbitration award, in part, on the failure
of the superior court to properly procure jurisdiction to confirm or
vacate the award. The court also found that this arbitration panel
failed to exercise independent judgment and thus granted the petitions for certiorari and remanded the questions to the respective
panels for an application of independent judgment.
CONCLUSION

In ProvidenceLodge No. 3, FraternalOrder of Police v. City of
Providence, the supreme court held that an interest arbitration
panel does have the authority to award COLAS, but that an arbitration panel must exercise its independent judgment in determining a city's ability to pay a COLA other than that proposed by a
city. The court also determined that that an arbitration panel or
the city may prospectively modify a COLA. In addition, the court
held that decisions of an arbitration panel under the FFAA and the
MPAA are only reviewable by petition for writ of certiorari to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court. Finally, the court concluded that
the FFAA and the MPAA are acts of general application and therefore supersede an inconsistent home rule charter provision.
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